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The primary aim of copyright law is to promote the creation and dissemination 
of knowledge by protecting the economic rights of authors.1  Economic rights, 
though valuable, do not encompass the free speech rights that can be threatened by 
the tension between copyright and the First Amendment.  Conflicts between 
copyright law and the First Amendment are sometimes characterized as pitting the 
economic rights of authors against the free speech rights of those who wish to use 
their copyrighted works.2  The so-called fair use doctrine and the idea/expression 
dichotomy—two exceptions to copyright law’s categorical prohibition on 
copying—are often touted as sufficient to accommodate the First Amendment 
problems raised by copyright law.3  However, in copyright cases in which an 
author’s message is distorted in ways she disavows, these two exceptions are 
inadequate to protect original authors’ free speech rights, which may be in 
jeopardy. 
There are cases in which a change to the content, form or context of a 
copyrighted work distorts its author’s message.  When this kind of distortion is 
found to be fair use, the author has no further recourse, as American copyright law 
does not recognize an author’s right to the integrity or attribution of her work 
(“moral rights”).4  In these cases, an author’s First Amendment right against forced 
speech can be violated if the change to the message of her work forces her to 
communicate in ways that she expressly disavows. 
In weighing the competing speech interests of an author and a second user (a 
party who facially violates copyright law through unauthorized copying), courts 
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 1. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 2. See, e.g., id. at 556–57 (noting that First Amendment values did not necessitate an expansion 
of the fair use doctrine amounting to an exception to the rule that “copyright assures those who write and 
publish factual narratives . . . that they may at least enjoy the right to market the original expression 
contained therein as just compensation for their investment”). 
 3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003). 
 4. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States:  Caught In the Crossfire 
Between Copyright and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985, 986–87 (2002). 
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frequently base their decisions on the perceived value of the disputed work’s 
content, or even the status of its author.5  As a result, some copyright decisions 
have the incidental effect of regulating speech in a way that is not content-neutral.  
This conflicts with traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, which subjects 
content-based restrictions to strict scrutiny under most circumstances.6  Decisions 
in which this kind of tension between copyright and the First Amendment arises 
suggest that the lack of moral rights recognition in American copyright law leaves 
authors insufficiently protected. 
The introduction of a right of integrity, attribution or disclosure in American 
copyright law would likely carry costs that would outweigh the protective benefits 
or, like many statutes, such a law might be prohibitively difficult to enact.  
However, courts could mitigate this particular First Amendment problem by 
narrowly construing the preemption provisions in the Visual Artists Rights Acts of 
1990 (VARA).7  Some states, including California and New York, have statutes 
that protect the moral rights of authors.8  However, these are entirely ineffective if 
and when they are preempted by VARA.9 
VARA, a federal statute that protects a very limited category of works of visual 
art from modification or misattribution, preempts all “legal or equitable rights that 
are equivalent” to the rights conferred by VARA and that apply to the same 
category of works.10  A narrow construction of what constitutes “equivalent” rights 
would allow an author to bring an action for unauthorized copying under the 
Copyright Act together with a cause of action for violating her work’s integrity 
under an applicable state moral rights statute such as the New York Artists’ 
Authorship Rights Act.11  Under this kind of regime, even if a court found the 
unauthorized copying of the author’s work to be fair use under federal law, she 
might still be awarded legal or equitable relief for the state law violation. 
Section I of this Note begins with a basic introduction to moral rights, first 
explaining the ways in which they are left unprotected by American copyright law 
and then discussing the reasons why they are nonetheless important.  Section II lays 
out the connection between the moral right of integrity and the First Amendment, 
concluding that damage to the integrity of an author’s work can violate the author’s 
right not to speak through her work.  Section III explores in detail the conflict 
 
 5. See R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm:  Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 423, 430 (2005) (observing that judicial discretion to determine fair use and the 
inconsistency that results “is likely to systematically disadvantage the new and unfamiliar . . . and may 
yield results that seem to turn as much on aspects of the parties themselves (e.g., socially conscious 
African-American author: ‘good’; Norwegian hacker teenager: ‘bad’) as on the merits”). 
 6. See 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH § 2.66 (2011). 
 7. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2006). 
 8. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 2011); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 
2011). 
 9. See Bd. of Managers of SoHo Int’l Arts Condo. v. New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 DAB, 2003 
WL 21403333, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 2003) (holding that VARA preempts the New York Artists’ 
Authorship Rights Act). 
 10. Id. §§ 106(a), 301(f). 
 11. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 2011). 
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between the free speech rights of authors and the free speech rights of second users.  
Section III.A uses several examples to illustrate how the conflict operates 
conceptually, while Section III.B discusses three cases in which the right of the 
author not to speak is actually violated.  Section IV discusses the implications of 
the competing free speech rights for both copyright and the First Amendment.  
Section V addresses potential solutions to the problem, arguing for a narrow 
construction of the preemption provisions in VARA that would allow state moral 
rights statutes to give broader protection to authors than federal copyright law can. 
I.  MORAL RIGHTS AND AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
A.  A BASIC INTRODUCTION TO MORAL RIGHTS 
Moral rights are rights afforded to authors and creators that protect their 
personal interests, as opposed to their economic interests, in their work.12  The term 
“moral rights,” which originates from the 19th century French concept of droit 
moral, does not connote moral judgments of right and wrong, but merely the idea 
that there are rights linked to an author’s identity that are separate from her 
economic motivations.13  The basic set of moral rights includes an author’s right to 
have her work attributed to her, the right to have the integrity of her work 
safeguarded and the right to choose when to disclose or withhold the work from the 
public.14  Moral rights are normally said to protect the reputation and honor of the 
author, but can also be understood to protect an author’s individual dignity.15 
The primary moral rights discussed in this Note are the rights of attribution and 
integrity.  The justifications for both rights share a premise with one of the 
traditional justifications for copyright law:  when an author creates a work, that 
work constitutes a part of the author’s personality and an extension of her 
identity.16  Justice Holmes famously observed:  “Personality always contains 
something unique.  It expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very 
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”17 
The notion that art expresses something irreducible about its maker is 
complemented by the Hegelian idea that the creation of a work results in the 
author’s personal development, to which she is entitled as a condition of her 
autonomy.18  Taken together, these two ideas present both personality- and 
 
 12. See Mark A. Petrolis, An Immoral Fight:  Shielding Moral Rights with First Amendment 
Jurisprudence When Fair Use Battles with Actual Malice, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 190, 
191 (2008). 
 13. Id. at 192. 
 14. See Kwall, supra note 4, at 986. 
 15. See id. at 987. 
 16. See, e.g., Christian G. Stallberg, Towards a New Paradigm in Justifying Copyright:  An 
Univeralistic-Transcendental Approach, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 333 (2008) 
(arguing that copyright can be justified if an intellectual work constitutes a complex speech act by the 
author). 
 17. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 300 (1903). 
 18. See Stallberg, supra note 16, at 348. 
(4) Leonard 3/20/2012  1:22 PM 
296 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [35:2 
autonomy-based justifications for copyright and for moral rights, which American 
copyright law largely fails to recognize, as discussed at length below.19  If every 
author is entitled to create works that are inextricably linked to her identity, then 
the act of creation produces a permanent relationship between author and work.  
That relationship can be made public by the attribution right and protected by the 
right of integrity. 
Despite this apparent conceptual harmony between copyright and the rights of 
attribution and integrity, moral rights are left largely unprotected by copyright in 
the United States.20  Copyright law prior to 1988 did not protect moral rights at 
all.21  In 1989, the United States attempted to join the Berne Convention, which is 
an international agreement governing copyright that also protects moral rights with 
respect to all literary and artistic works.22  The United States had maintained a 
longstanding opposition to joining the convention because it would force Congress 
to accept moral rights in some capacity—something Congress was disinclined to do 
for a variety of reasons.23  Nonetheless, in 1989 the United States finally joined the 
agreement in an attempt to reap the economic benefits of its international copyright 
provisions, claiming that existing U.S. law complied with Berne’s moral rights 
regime.24 
Though at the time, Congress insisted that existing United States law sufficiently 
protected the moral rights envisioned by the Convention, legislative history 
suggests otherwise.25  Senator Orrin Hatch, even while maintaining that the United 
States fully complied with Berne, insisted that “our judicial system has consistently 
rejected causes of action denominated as ‘moral rights’ or arising under the moral 
rights doctrine.”26  While the U.S. joined the Convention, Congress found a way to 
sidestep moral rights.  Congress interpreted the agreement as requiring specific 
implementing legislation; this interpretation allowed the United States to join the 
Convention while indefinitely postponing the fulfillment of its obligation to protect 
moral rights.27 
At the time of U.S. accession to Berne, Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was 
thought to be the only federal law capable of protecting the moral right of 
attribution.28
 
 One of the claims that can be brought under Section 43(a) is that a 
defendant has misled the public by representing the plaintiff’s goods or services as 
 
 19. See Kwall, supra note 4, at 987. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Section 106 of the Copyright Act, which enumerates the exclusive rights afforded to authors 
in their works, was and is entirely silent on moral rights.  17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
 22. See Dane S. Ciolino, Rethinking the Compatibility of Moral Rights and Fair Use, 54 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 33, 45 (1997). 
 23. See Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the United States and the 
United Kingdom:  Challenges and Opportunities Under the U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 24 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 247 (2006). 
 24. Id. at 251–52. 
 25. See Dana L. Burton, Artists’ Moral Rights:  Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 
SMU L. REV. 639, 641 (1995). 
 26. See id. (citing 138 Cong. Rec. 28,306 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch)). 
 27. See Bird & Ponte, supra note 23, at 251. 
 28. See Kwall, supra note 4, at 988. 
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its own.29  In 2003, however, the Supreme Court held in Dastar v. Twentieth 
Century Fox that 43(a), which provides a cause of action for the “false designations 
of origins” in connection with goods or services, has application only to the origins 
of a physical good and not to any underlying copyrightable material.30  Though the 
scope of Dastar is the subject of debate, it may have eviscerated Section 43(a) as a 
shield for artists’ moral rights.31 
Even before Dastar, however, Section 43(a) was an imperfect safeguard for the 
right of attribution, for example, because the Lanham Act is focused on consumer 
protection and not on noneconomic authorial interests.32  The Act seeks to prevent 
consumers from being confused by the false designation of goods or services.  
Without a showing of consumer confusion, which has been called “a concept 
totally unrelated to the authorial interests violated by a defendant’s failure to 
attribute authorship,” a 43(a) action fails.33 
Though Congress had claimed at the time of the United States accession to 
Berne that no change in U.S. law was required to satisfy Berne’s moral rights 
requirements, it nonetheless enacted the Visual Rights Artist Act of 1990 (VARA), 
in part to promote uniformity of the law against a backdrop of disparate state moral 
rights statutes.34  VARA purports to protect certain works of visual art from 
mutilation, but does so in a very limited way.35  It applies only to a very restricted 
category of works of art.36  Protection is confined to works of visual art prepared 
for exhibition in editions of 200 copies or fewer, and does not extend to books, 
films, drawings, works made for hire or a host of other types of work.37  Beyond 
 
 29. See id. at 1003. 
 30. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–32 (2003). 
 31. See Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a Trademark:  A Perverse Perspective on the 
Moral Right of “Paternity”?, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 379, 380 (2005) (“The moral right of . . . 
attribution of authorship, always precariously positioned in the U.S., may be moribund following . . . 
Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox.”). 
 32. See Kwall, supra note 4, at 988. 
 33. See id. at 1026. 
 34. See Robert C. Bird, Moral Rights:  Diagnosis and Rehabilitation, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 407, 427 
(2009). 
 35. See Kwall, supra note 4, at 987. 
 36. The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), defines “visual art” as: 
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 
copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a 
sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively 
numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a 
still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy that is 
signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author. 
A work of visual art does not include:  (A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, 
diagram, model, applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, 
newspaper, periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or 
similar publication; (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, 
covering, or packaging material or container; (iii) any portion or part of any item described in 
clause (i) or (ii); (B) any work made for hire; or (C) any work not subject to copyright protection 
under this title. 
 37. See Burton, supra note 25, at 642. 
(4) Leonard 3/20/2012  1:22 PM 
298 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [35:2 
VARA, there is nothing in the Copyright Act that protects moral rights, and VARA 
itself is inadequate to do so.38  Further, VARA preempts state moral rights statutes 
that were enacted in the wake of the United States’ failure to comply with the moral 
rights provisions of Berne.39  At least fourteen states and Puerto Rico enacted moral 
rights statutes following the U.S. accession to Berne.40  Though these statutes vary, 
most include a right of attribution and integrity.41  Under a liberal construction of 
VARA’s preemption provisions, as discussed at length below, these statutes are 
preempted by federal law. 
B.  WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT MORAL RIGHTS? 
There are at least two reasons to care about the moral rights of authors.  The first 
has to do with incentives for creation.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly made 
clear that the primary purpose of copyright is to promote progress by providing 
authors with economic incentives to create.42  Powerful as economic incentives 
may be, they nevertheless fail to account fully for the desire to create.43  Strong 
arguments have been made that the urge to create in some ways cannot be 
incentivized by extrinsic motivations, either economic or reputational.44  However, 
it does not follow that because creation cannot be fully explained by extrinsic 
incentives, those incentives serve no essential function.  From a theoretical and a 
practical perspective, moral rights provide reputational supplements for the 
economic system of incentives put in place by copyright law.45  As Professor 
Lastowka argues, self-interested authors create their works in pursuit of attention 
and recognition, not just for monetary profit:  “Promoting personal reputation 
within a particular community is certainly not the sole motivator for . . . copyright 
production, but . . . it is among the top two.”46  For example, law professors often 
distribute their work products for free or spend their time writing nonmonetized 
blogs in hopes of reaping the reputational benefits that come with disseminating 
their (properly attributed) work.47 
The second reason to care about moral rights, and the one that is the focus of 
this Note, has to do with the concept of an original work as an act of free speech.  
The First Amendment protects every person’s right to make speech and largely to 
 
 38. See id. 
 39. See Bird & Ponte, supra note 23, at 256. 
 40. See id. at 254. 
 41. See id. at 255. 
 42. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Kwall, supra note 4, at 989. 
 43. See Rebecca Tushnet, Economies of Desire:  Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 513, 516 (2009). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 520 (“[N]on-monetary incentives sometimes suffice to inspire authorship.” (quoting 
Tom Bell)). 
 46. Greg Lastowka, Digital Attribution:  Copyright and the Right to Credit, 87 B.U. L. REV. 41, 
58 (2007). 
 47. See id. at 60. 
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make it in the way that she chooses.48  The rights of attribution and integrity protect 
the contours of that speech.  Attribution links the speech to the speaker, while 
integrity ensures that the content of the speech is as the speaker intended.  In certain 
recurring types of copyright cases, the connection between moral rights and the 
First Amendment produces a tension between the speech interests of the first author 
and the speech interests of the second user.49  Before exploring that tension and the 
way in which courts resolve it, it is important to clarify the relationship between 
moral rights and the free speech rights protected by the First Amendment. 
II.  MORAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT NOT TO SPEAK 
A.  THE RIGHT OF INTEGRITY PROTECTS SPEECH, NOT JUST REPUTATION 
Though moral rights are frequently said to protect the reputation and honor of 
the author, they protect more than that.50  Moral rightsspecifically the right of 
integrity and, to a lesser extent, attributionprotect the free speech interests of the 
author.  The idea that moral rights protect reputation and honor is based on the 
premise that a link between author and work is created because the work embodies 
and extends the author’s identity.51  The work is such an extension because its 
creation is an act of speech on the part of the author.52  Authors, once they have 
spoken through their original creation, should not be divorced from the speech act 
made unless they explicitly disclaim it. 
The Romantic idea that there is a personality-based connection between author 
and work has been criticized by many theorists and commentators, as has the 
copyright law in general, to the extent it has been argued to rely on that idea.53  The 
postmodern view that no work can be said to have a single author and that unitary 
authorship is a myth is a compelling one for the purposes of interpretation.54  
Indeed, outside of the legal context and its dependence on absolute distinctions of 
ownership and property rights, the idea that a work bears no essential relationship 
to its author may encourage artistic production by loosening the strictures of 
attribution and influence.  The logic of copyright law, however, depends on such 
ownership distinctions.  The idea that an author should be rewarded for her work 
 
 48. Within the confines of permissible government regulation as defined by the body of First 
Amendment doctrine. 
 49. In this Note, “first author” refers to the original creator of a work and “second user” refers to 
the person who uses the copyrighted work in a way that may either be infringing or fairer. 17 U.S.C. § 
107 (2006). 
 50. See Kwall, supra note 4, at 986–87 (arguing that moral rights protect the author’s dignity as 
an individual and serve a spiritual function that transcends reputation). 
 51. See supra Section I.A. 
 52. See generally Stallberg, supra note 16, at 361–60. 
 53. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories:”  Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights 
and Copyright’s Joint-Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2001) [hereinafter Kwall, Author-
Stories]. 
 54. Id.  See also Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIC, TEXT 142 (Stephen 
Heath  trans., Noonday Press ed., 1988) (1977); Michel Foucault, What is an Author?, in TEXTUAL 
STRATEGIES:  PERSPECTIVES IN POST-STRUCTURALIST CRITICISM 141 (Josué V. Harari ed., 1979). 
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and that it is possible to incentivize her to create more of it is premised on a 
proprietary relationship between author and work.55  What would be the point of 
rewarding a work of authorship if that work were entirely divorced from its author?  
The incentive structures fundamental to copyright law depend on the assumption 
that an author maintains some essential relationship to her creations.56 
The idea that authors speak through their work and that their work, once 
released, acts as an existing artifact of the author’s speech, logically leads to a 
conclusion that a distortion or misappropriation of the work implicates the author’s 
right to free speech.  Specifically, a violation of an author’s right not to speak 
arguably arises with every violation of the moral right of integrity.  If an author’s 
work is distorted or misappropriated, she is forced to speak again through the work 
to which she is inextricably linked, in a way that she has not chosen or has even 
disavowed. 
The First Amendment recognizes not only a right to speak and to make speech 
in a mode of your choosing, but also the right not to speak.57  The forced speech 
doctrine of the First Amendment dictates that the government cannot compel a 
speaker to make statements or state beliefs against her will.58  The prohibition on 
forced speech is invoked when the government threatens or punishes speech with 
government action that is “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.”59  
The forced speech doctrine is primarily intended to prevent the government from 
forcing people to make speeches or state beliefs that the government favors (i.e., 
political, national or religious statements).60  Because the doctrine rests on a 
fundamental constitutional principle, however, it has wider applicability.61  As the 
Supreme Court stated in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., “At the heart 
of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for 
himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and 
adherence.”62 
By refusing to recognize the moral rights of attribution and integrity in even a 
limited way, copyright law in some ways does what the First Amendment prohibits: 
it forces people to speak.  It is true that there is a qualitative difference between, for 
example, requiring children to recite the Pledge of Allegiance and deciding a 
copyright dispute in favor of the second user, so that the first author’s original work 
is distorted in a way that directly contradicts her political message and views.63  
The first is a clear violation of the First Amendment and its core protections, 
 
 55. The constitutional provision enabling Congress to enact copyright law, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 1, identifies this incentive system:  “To promote the progress of Science and the Useful Arts...” 
(emphasis added). 
 56. See Kwall, Author-Stories, supra note 53, at 21. 
 57. See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 4.26. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’n Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994). 
 63. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Maxtone-Graham v. 
Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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whereas the second violation is more attenuated and depends on a number of 
inferences (i.e., a work of authorship is a speech act; moral rights protect speech, 
not just reputation). 
However, the key principle behind the forced speech doctrine is that “no official, 
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in . . . matters of opinion . . .”64  
Judges, in evaluating the content of a disputed work in copyright cases, are officials 
who choose favored or “valuable” speech and thus prescribe what is orthodox.  For 
example, if a judge evaluates two political messages—that of the author and that of 
the second user—and chooses the content of one over the other under the guise of 
fair use, he both “prescribes what is orthodox” and violates the free speech rights of 
the author by imposing a restriction on her speech that is not content-neutral. 
Furthermore, the link between the forced speech doctrine and copyright law is 
an important topic of scrutiny because copyright law is supposed to be “the engine 
of free expression.”65  In fact, the Supreme Court has stated that fair use and the 
idea/expression dichotomy are generally sufficient to protect all potential First 
Amendment interests implicated by copyright law.66  Though this may be an 
accurate assessment from the perspective of the second user, it may not be for the 
author.  If these copyright doctrines, by law, are meant to encompass all First 
Amendment claims, they are inadequate to the task. 
The idea that free speech concerns are implicated by copyright disputes is far 
from a new one, and is in fact explicitly acknowledged by many courts, particularly 
those dealing with fair use.67  However, most courts and scholars tend to focus on 
the free speech interests of the second users and the interests of the community in 
hearing as much speech as possible.68  The statement that copyright is “the engine 
of free expression” was intended to emphasize that the existing limitations on the 
rights protected by the Copyright Act strike a balance between protecting the 
economic interests of authors and the free speech interests of everyone else.69 
However, the conflict between authors and second users is sometimes best 
understood as a conflict between the right not to speak and the right to create 
speech rather than as one that pits a limited authorial monopoly against the tides of 
free speech.  There are speech interests on both sides of the equation, and courts’ 
valuation of these interests, whether acknowledged or not, determine whose First 
Amendment rights win out. 
 
 64. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 65. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985). 
 66. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190 (2003) (stating that unless a law alters the traditional 
contours of copyright, it is generally immune from First Amendment scrutiny because of the safety 
valves of fair use and the idea/expression dichotomy). 
 67. See, e.g., Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d 1253. 
 68. See, e.g., David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 1393, 1406 (2009) (describing the ways in which the speech interests of speakers and 
listeners are in conflict with the authorial monopoly granted by copyright). 
 69. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 558. 
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III.  THE CLASH IN PRACTICE:  THE RIGHT AGAINST FORCED 
SPEECH VS. THE RIGHT TO CREATE SPEECH 
The right of the first author not to speak through his work is pitted against the 
right of the second user to create new speech in cases in which the integrity of the 
disputed work is at stake, either explicitly or implicitly.  This can happen in several 
different contexts.  First, this kind of free speech conflict arises in cases where a 
second user has infringed one of the exclusive rights granted to authors by Section 
106 of the Copyright Act:  the right to reproduce the copyrighted work; the right to 
prepare derivative works based on the original; the right to distribute, sell or license 
the work; the right to perform the work publicly; the right to display the work 
publicly; or the right to digitally transmit the work.70  Second, the free speech 
conflict occurs in cases in which a second user has exceeded the scope of a license 
granted to her by the author.  Finally, and perhaps most frequently, it arises in cases 
where a second user raises the defense of fair use.  In each of these situations, a 
second use is ostensibly in conflict with an author’s legal right to her work.  This 
apparent economic conflict could instead be viewed as a conflict between the 
second “fair” use and the author’s First Amendment right not to speak. 
The cases in each of these contexts present their own set of issues and questions, 
but there are common threads in all of them.  First, they are all cases that involve a 
work that is within the realm of literary and artistic works (broadly construed), 
rather than, for example, in the realm of software or new media.  Second, each 
involves the integrity of the underlying work in dispute.  Third, courts in each of 
these cases are forced to evaluate the content of the speech on both sides of the 
conflict—something that First Amendment doctrine generally prohibits the 
government from doing.71 
By evaluating the content of the speech in this way, courts arguably violate the 
First Amendment principle that regulations based on the content of speech are 
disfavored and normally trigger strict scrutiny, whereas regulations that are 
content-neutral are subject to less rigorous scrutiny.72  The strict scrutiny standard 
requires that the challenged regulation be justified by a “compelling” government 
interest and that the regulation be “narrowly tailored” to that interest, or the “least 
restrictive means” of effectuating that interest.73  Regulations subject to strict 
scrutiny very rarely satisfy those requirements.74  By evaluating the content of 
speech in copyright cases that implicate the First Amendment, a court can 
effectively implement a content-based speech restriction without having to subject 
that restriction to the rigors of strict scrutiny. 
 
 70. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (2006). 
 71. See SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 6, §§ 2.3–2.5. 
 72. Id. § 2.66 (explaining that content-neutral speech regulations are ones not based on the 
content of the speech).  A paradigmatic category of content-neutral speech regulations are restrictions on 
the time, manner or place in which the speech occurs.  Id. 
 73. Id. § 4.2. 
 74. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200 (1992) (“[W]e readily acknowledge that a law 
rarely survives [strict] scrutiny . . . .”). 
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The implications of all of these common threads are discussed in Section IV, but 
for the purposes of the following analysis, it is enough to identify the two recurring 
themes:  (1) a common type of speech conflict and (2) a common mode of 
resolving that conflict. 
The following Section provides two examples of the way in which a threat to the 
integrity of a work can function as a threat to the First Amendment rights of the 
first author.  First, Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Systems illustrates how an 
actual change in the content of a copyrighted work can mutilate it and damage its 
integrity, thus presenting a potential violation of the author’s speech rights.75  
Second, the unauthorized use of popular songs at political rallies demonstrates that 
a similar mutilation can be effected simply by placing the work in an objectionable 
context.76  The latter example is particularly useful for the purposes of exploring 
First Amendment violations because it is political in nature. 
It may seem counterintuitive to begin with Gilliam, which holds in favor of the 
first authors, thereby avoiding any potential violation of their First Amendment 
rights.  However, the reasoning of the case and the attention that the court pays to 
the moral rights of authors provides valuable context for the cases that follow.  The 
sections that follow deal with cases in which the second user’s use is deemed fair, 
consequently validating his speech while violating the first author’s right against 
compulsory speech. 
A.   ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:  GILLIAM V. AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES 
AND THE USE OF PRO-LICENSED SONGS IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies is fairly unique in its explicit 
acknowledgment that copyright law inadequately protects the integrity of authors’ 
works.77  In Gilliam, the British comedy group Monty Python entered into an 
agreement with the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) under which Monty 
Python would write and deliver scripts for the thirty minute BBC series “Monty 
Python’s Flying Circus.”78  Though the BBC was licensed to use the scripts to 
create derivative works (the recorded programs), Monty Python retained the 
copyrights in the original scripts and the majority of control over any revisions to 
those scripts.79  The BBC licensed the distribution rights in the program to Time-
Life Films with extremely minimal editing privileges (inserting commercials and 
complying with government regulations only); Time-Life in turn licensed the 
program to American Broadcasting Company (ABC) to broadcast.80 
 
 75. Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). 
 76. Unauthorized, here, means unauthorized by the author or copyright holder of the song and not 
necessarily unlicensed.  Even when songs are licensed by Performing Rights Organizations (PROs), the 
author generally remains uninvolved and therefore may still object to the use, though he typically has no 
legal claim. 
 77. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24. 
 78. Id. at 17. 
 79. Id. at 17, 19–20. 
 80. Id. at 17–18. 
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When ABC broadcast the first episode of the series, the version it presented had 
been significantly edited.  Not only had the program been truncated to make room 
for commercials, but it had been substantially stripped of subject matter that ABC 
had found to be too offensive or obscene for commercial broadcast.81  Monty 
Python, upon seeing a tape of the first broadcast, sought injunctive relief after a 
negotiation attempt with ABC failed.82  Under copyright case law, one who obtains 
a license to use a copyrighted work must not exceed the scope of the license.83  The 
existence of a licensing contract does not obviate the necessity of compliance with 
copyright law.  Therefore, the Second Circuit granted a preliminary injunction 
against ABC, finding that ABC’s extensive revisions to the script and the recorded 
program exceeded the scope of the license between Monty Python and the BBC.84 
ABC’s unauthorized editing, the court reasoned, had deprived Monty Python of 
the right to control the way in which the original work was presented to the 
public.85  The court went further, however, stating that ABC’s editing constituted 
an actionable mutilation of Monty Python’s work and that the version that was 
broadcast impaired the original’s integrity and “represented to the public as the 
product of [Monty Python] what was actually a mere caricature of their talents.”86  
ABC, in the absence of more than “speculative” harm to the company, could not 
persuade the court that this mutilation was warranted.87  ABC’s editing implicated 
the moral rights of both disclosure and integrity.  Monty Python, having suffered 
the distortion of their work (and thus their speech), also lost the ability to control 
the release of their original message to the public.88 
The court’s reasoning in Gilliam reveals that the damaged integrity of Monty 
Python’s work implicated the group’s rights to free speech.  ABC’s mutilation 
forced Monty Python to speak in a way that they did not endorse, and indeed, in a 
way that they expressly rejected.  ABC effected the mutilation, moreover, in the 
service of making the program more commercially marketable.  The only 
conceivable speech interest at stake for ABC was in broadcasting a cleaner, more 
socially moderate version than the original.89  In balancing the hardship to each 
party, the court was implicitly weighing these two speech interests. 
By contrast to the “mutilation” suffered by Monty Python, all injury to ABC was 
“speculative” and involved, at most, a threat to ABC’s relationship with its 
affiliates or the cost of unforeseen advertising expenses.90  Whereas Monty 
Python’s speech was both creative and provocative, it strains interpretation to say 
 
 81. Id. at 18. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 21. 
 84. Id. at 21, 23 (granting a preliminary injunction and finding a “substantial likelihood that, after 
a full trial, appellants will succeed in proving infringement of their copyright by ABC’s broadcast of 
edited versions of Monty Python programs”). 
 85. Id. at 23. 
 86. Id. at 25. 
 87. Id. at 19. 
 88. Id. at 23. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. at 19. 
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that ABC’s speech interest was creative in any way.  Had the court found in favor 
of ABC rather than Monty Python, it would have allowed Monty Python’s speech, 
as expressed through their copyrighted work, to be distorted against their wishes.  
By forcing Monty Python to speak in a way they expressly disavowed, the court 
would effectively violate Monty Python’s First Amendment right against forced 
speech.  If it had done so because of a perceived lack of value or a bias against 
obscenity, it would also have been regulating speech in a way that is not content-
neutral, thus contravening First Amendment doctrine.91 
Gilliam is notable in that the court advocates explicitly for moral rights.  Judge 
Lumbard writes: 
[T]he economic incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that serves as the 
foundation for American copyright law . . . cannot be reconciled with the inability of 
artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their work to the public 
on which the artists are financially dependent . . . . Although [decisions granting relief 
for misrepresentations of artists’ work] are clothed in terms of proprietary right in 
one’s creation, they also properly vindicate the author’s personal right to prevent the 
presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form.92 
Though the court does not recognize the relevance of the First Amendment to 
moral rights here, it puts the pieces together, so to speak.  By linking the personal 
right of disclosure (in other words, the right to speak publicly) to the right of 
integrity (the right to choose one’s expression), the court identifies the underlying 
values of the First Amendment and posits them as a necessary condition for 
American copyright law.  Economic incentives, the court seems to suggest, cannot 
function adequately without the availability of a remedy for the violation of moral 
rights. 
The reasoning in Gilliam bears heavily on another set of situations in which an 
otherwise licensed use exceeds the scope of that license, implicating the authors’ 
rights not to speak:  the use of popular music during political campaigns.  The 
central idea of Gilliamthat an author has a right to control the message of his 
work, either by maintaining the integrity of the work’s content or the context of its 
presentationis very much at stake in this emerging issue. 
The use of music in political campaigns dates back at least to the first 
presidential election.93  A basic First Amendment and moral rights problem arises, 
 
 91. See Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 579 (1995) 
(“While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to 
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a 
disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government.”); SMOLLA & NIMMER, 
supra note 6, § 4.26. 
 92. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 24 (citations omitted). 
 93. See Lauren M. Bilasz, Copyrights, Campaigns, and the Collective Administration of 
Performance Rights:  A Call to End Blanket Licensing of Political Events, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 305, 
305 (2010) (observing that during George Washington’s campaign, supporters sang along to “Follow 
Washington,” and in subsequent years presidential candidates set political lyrics to familiar songs, 
including William Henry Harrison and John Tyler’s use of the music to the popular song “Little Pigs” 
for their campaign song “Tippecanoe  and Tyler Too”). 
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however, when politicians use popular songs to support their candidacy and the 
artists behind those songs object to the implicit endorsement that is inevitably 
invoked by the use.94  The core message of the artist’s work in these situations is 
damaged by its use in context.  For example, the band Heart publicly denounced 
Vice-Presidential candidate Sarah Palin’s use of their song “Barracuda” on her 
campaign trail, releasing the following statement: 
Sarah Palin’s views in NO WAY represent us as American women.  We ask that our 
song ‘Barracuda’ no longer be used to promote her image.  The song “Barracuda” was 
written in the late 70s as a scathing rant against the soulless, corporate nature of the 
music business, particularly for women.  (The “barracuda” represented the 
business.) . . . [H]eart did not and would not authorize the use of their song at the 
RNC . . . .95 
The statement by Ann and Nancy Wilson reveals several important points.  First, 
the use of the song to endorse a political candidate changed the song’s meaning in a 
way that the authors did not intend.  This happened simply because of the context 
in which the song was played, and by whom.  No change to the content of the song 
was required to distort its message.  Second, what was at stake for the artists was 
their right to free speech.  Their critique of the corporate nature of the music 
business with regard to women, in their view, was directly at odds with the Sarah 
Palin campaign message.  The statement that they “did not and would not 
authorize” Sarah Palin’s use of their song because her views “in no way represent 
[them]” indicates that the misappropriation of the song compelled Ann and Nancy 
Wilson to speak in a way they explicitly disavowed. 
Though Palin’s use of the song arguably violated Heart’s right against forced 
speech, it did not violate copyright law.  The McCain-Palin campaign obtained a 
blanket license to use and perform the song from a performing rights organization 
(PRO).96  Without such a blanket license, however, artists have recourse to sue.  
Jackson Browne, for instance, sued the GOP, the RNC and John McCain for 
running a campaign ad against Barack Obama that used Browne’s song “Running 
on Empty.”97  Don Henley sued Charles DeVore, a Republican California State 
Assemblyman who ran for United States Senate against Senator Barbara Boxer in 
2010, for making two anti-Obama videos that copied portions of Henley’s songs 
“The Boys of Summer” and “All She Wants to Do is Dance.” 98  The copyright 
litigation was resolved on summary judgment in favor of Henley.99 
Henley sued in part because he thought that DeVore’s use of the songs falsely 
 
 94. See, e.g., Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 95. Whitney Pastorek, Exclusive:  Heart’s Nancy Wilson Responds to McCain Campaign’s Use of 
‘Barracuda’ at Republican Convention, ENT. WKLY. (Sept. 5, 2008), http://insidetv.ew.com/2008/09/05/ 
heart-responds. 
 96. Bilasz, supra note 93, at 309. 
 97. This case settled, so it is not clear how a court would have evaluated the competing speech 
interests of McCain as a political candidate and Browne as the copyright holder and performer of the 
copyrighted work. 
 98. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1147–49. 
 99. Id. at 1169. 
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suggested his endorsement of Charles DeVore.100  In fact, a survey prepared by an 
expert for Henley showed that 48% of people who saw DeVore’s version of 
Henley’s two songs thought that Henley either “endorsed the video(s) or authorized 
or approved the use of his music in the video(s).”101  The court ultimately found 
that DeVore’s use of Henley’s songs was infringing, but primarily because it did 
not qualify as a parody.102  Under established copyright doctrine, if the court had 
found that DeVore’s use of Henley’s songs constituted parody (a form of free 
speech typically considered transformative) rather than satire, the use would likely 
have been deemed fair.103  Instead, it was found to be a satire, which does not 
weigh in favor of fair use, as transformative parody does.104  Therefore, DeVore’s 
unauthorized use of Henley’s songs for satirical purposes created an implied act of 
speech on Henley’s part that he disavowed, but that was only actionable because of 
a doctrinal nuance.  Had DeVore created a parody and not a satire, his use might 
not have created a cognizable legal claim; the court took pains to distinguish 
parody from satire and suggested that would be much easier for a defendant to 
succeed on a defense of fair use if he created the former instead of the latter.105  
Cognizable claim or not, Henley’s First Amendment right against forced speech 
would have been threatened in the case of parody or satire by DeVore’s exercise of 
his First Amendment right to free speech.  These campaign cases provide a clear 
and relatively uncomplicated example of the way in which free speech interests are 
forced to compete under copyright law. 
B.  PROBLEMATIC CASES:  FORCING AUTHORS TO SPEAK 
Copyright disputes in which the second user prevails shed light on the values 
that courts tend to rely upon in weighing the speech interests of authors against 
those of second users.  The cases presented in this section all involve the defense of 
fair use.  Unsurprisingly, therefore, all three contain explicit judgments about the 
“purpose and character” of the second use as compared to that of the underlying 
work; the fair use doctrine, as codified in the Copyright Act, compels this 
analysis.106  The fair use doctrine provides that under some circumstances, an 
 
 100. Id. at 1149. 
 101. Id. at 1169. 
 102. As discussed in greater detail in this section, parody doctrinally falls within fair use because it 
requires the use of the copyrighted work to produce socially valuable commentary.  Satire, by contrast, 
simply uses a copyrighted work to produce social criticism not closely related to the work itself.  
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994). 
 103. See BRUCE P. KELLER, JEFFREY P. CUNARD & ROBERT SPOO, COPYRIGHT LAW:  A 
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE § 8:5.5 (2011) (noting that though there is no categorical rule that parodies 
always constitute fair use, a finding of parody weighs in favor of fair use such that “a true, 
transformative parody is likely to be deemed a fair use under section 107”). 
 104. See id. 
 105. Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (“[These songs are] satire, not parody . . . [which] is 
insufficient justification for appropriating Henley’s works . . . [S]atire faces a higher bar for fair use 
because it requires greater justification for appropriating the original work.”). 
 106. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing “purpose and character” analysis in the 
first factor). 
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unauthorized use of copyrighted work is “fair” rather than infringing.  In evaluating 
whether a given use is fair, courts must consider the following four factors: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.107 
The purpose and character factor, together with the market effect factor, tends to 
be dispositive in fair use cases as this focuses the fair use analysis on the 
transformative nature of the second use.108  The second factor, the nature of the 
copyrighted work, is a proxy for the idea that “some works are closer to the core of 
intended copyright protection than others.”109  What this means in practice is that 
courts are more likely to find a use fair when the underlying work is factual rather 
than creative and less likely to find a use fair when the underlying work is 
unpublished.110  The character, nature and purpose of both the underlying work and 
the second use seem to be permissible subjects of consideration in fair use.111 
So what, then, is the problem with these courts’ value-laden modes of 
evaluation?  While purporting to consider the broader questions of “type” and 
“purpose,” courts actually evaluate the quality of the content of the underlying 
work and the second use.  Blanch v. Koons, discussed immediately below, provides 
a good example of this evaluation.  This mode of reasoning, which weighs the 
comparative value of the original and the second use in a way that is anything but 
content-neutral, may result in a finding of fair use.  By finding fair use, the court 
permits the second user to distort the original message of the underlying work 
based on an evaluation of its content.  Because of the personality- and speech-based 
link between author and work, this has the effect of violating the author’s right 
against compulsory speech. 
In Blanch v. Koons, photographer Andrea Blanch sued Jeff Koons, a successful 
visual artist known for neo-Pop appropriation art, for copying her photograph “Silk 
Sandals by Gucci” in his painting “Niagara.”112  Blanch’s photograph was 
commercial, depicted a woman’s legs and sandal-clad feet and was originally 
published in Allure magazine as part of a feature on metallic cosmetics.113  The 
photograph was not devoid of substance.  Blanch herself indicated that she had 
intended to convey “sexuality” and to vest the image with an “erotic sense.”114  
Koons’s painting incorporated the image of the legs and feet into a scene depicting 
 
 107. Id. § 107(1)–(4). 
 108. KELLER et al., supra note 103, § 8.4.2. 
 109. This is because facts and ideas are uncopyrightable and because copyright law provides 
original authors with the right of first publication, see Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
110.  See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 256 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 111. See KELLER et al., supra note 103. 
 112. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 248. 
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a landscape and an assortment of desserts.115  The painting, Koons explained, was 
meant “to comment on the ways in which some of our most basic appetites—for 
food, play, and sex—are mediated by popular images.”116 
The court found that Koons’s use of the image was fair, relying not only on the 
lack of economic harm to Blanch but also on the value of Koons’s social 
commentary, as opposed to the value of a commercial photograph.117  Though the 
court applied the four fair use factors as instructed by statute, it focused primarily 
on the subjective value of the content of each work.  In the eyes of the court, 
Koons’s work was valuable social and artistic commentary and therefore useful 
speech, whereas Blanch’s work contained a seemingly less valuable message.  
Notably, the court devoted a substantial amount of space to reproducing Koons’s 
own statement about the content of his work, while relegating Blanch’s explanation 
of her work to a mere sentence or two.118  Their juxtaposition of the two “purposes” 
of the image was in actuality a juxtaposition of quality: 
Koons’s . . . purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from Blanch’s 
goals in creating it.  Compare Koons’s [statement] (“I want the viewer to think about 
his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and images and at the same 
time gain new insight into how these affect our lives.”) with Blanch’s [statement] (“I 
wanted to show some sort of erotic sense[;] . . . to get . . . more of a sexuality to the 
photographs.”).  The sharply different objectives that Koons had in using, and Blanch 
had in creating, “Silk Sandals” confirms the transformative nature of the use.119 
The mere fact that the court quoted the words “I want” from both Koons’s and 
Blanch’s statements does not mean that it is evaluating purpose; clearly, what is at 
stake here is the value of the underlying messages.  The court, in finding Koons’s 
use fair, decided that a social commentary on commercially mediated experience 
was, in this instance, more valuable than an aesthetic representation or statement 
about sexuality. 
The court’s content value judgments are even more apparent in its refusal to 
apply copyright law’s parody/satire distinction.  A parody that copies an underlying 
work, even if it would otherwise constitute copyright infringement, may fall within 
fair use because it uses the elements of the underlying work to comment or criticize 
that work, which is considered socially valuable.120 
Another way of putting this is that parody “needs to mimic an original to make 
its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . . 
imagination . . . .”121  For example, “When Sonny Sniffs Glue,” a song by DJ Rick 
Dees intended to mock “When Sunny Gets Blue,” sung by Johnny Mathis, was 
found to constitute parody because it was intended “to poke fun at the composers’ 
 
 115. Id. at 247–48. 
 116. Id. at 247. 
 117. Id. at 253–54, 258. 
 118. See id. at 247. 
 119. Id. at 252. 
 120. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
 121. Id. at 580–81. 
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song, and at Mr. Mathis’s rather singular vocal range . . . [not] merely as a vehicle 
to achieve a comedic objective unrelated to the song.”122 
Satire, as the quoted passage indicates, does not need to use the underlying 
work.  It can “stand on its own two feet” and criticizes something outside of the 
underlying work.123  For example, The Cat NOT in the Hat!, a book about the O.J. 
Simpson double murder trial written in the style of Dr. Seuss, was found to be 
satire rather than parody because, though it “broadly mimic[ked] Dr. Seuss’ 
characteristic style, it [did] not hold his style up to ridicule.”124  A second user 
borrowing for the purposes of satire looks like an infringer looking to draw 
attention to his work or “to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.”125  
Satire, without additional justification, is doctrinally outside of fair use.126 
The court in Koons acknowledges that “Niagara” is aptly characterized as satire 
because it comments not on Blanch’s photo but on commercialism and 
contemporary life.127  Despite the fact that it was “clear enough to [the court] that 
Koons’s use of a slick fashion photograph enable[d] him to satirize life . . . seen 
through the prism of slick fashion photography,” the court refused to apply the 
distinction between parody and satire (which would have weighed in favor of 
Blanch) and instead simply found that Koons had stated a justification for his 
borrowing.128  Ironically, in doing so, the court disavowed its own ability to judge 
the artistic merits of either work.129 
The key point to take from Blanch v. Koons is that even if the court is right by 
most accounts, its decision does have the effect of forcing Blanch to speak through 
her photograph.  It achieves that effect by making a normative judgment about her 
speech that is not content-neutral.  If an author’s work is distorted or 
misappropriated, she is forced to speak again through the work to which she is 
inextricably linked, in a way that she has not chosen or has even disavowed.  This 
is not to say that the case necessarily should have been decided differently or that 
Koons’ piece is not valuable.  However, the fact that Blanch’s speech rights—not 
just her economic rights—are implicated and threatened by Koons’s use, should not 
be ignored in the fair use analysis. 
These questions become even more salient in a First Amendment context in 
cases dealing with speech that is explicitly political.  Two cases from the Southern 
District of New York demonstrate the difficulty of the speech conflict in the 
political arena:  just as the author’s right not to participate in stating a political view 
she does not espouse becomes more crucial, so does the second user’s right to make 
new political speech and contribute to political discourse. 
 
 122. Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434–36 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 123. Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255. 
 124. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396, 1401 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
 125. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. 
 126. See Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. (“[W]e need not depend on our own poorly honed artistic sensibilities.”). 
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In Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, Katrina Maxtone-Graham, the author of the 
journalistic, pro-choice book Pregnant By Mistake, sued the author of a scholarly 
pro-life book, Rachel Weeping.130  Reverend James Burtchaell, the author of 
Rachel Weeping, had requested Maxtone-Graham’s permission to reproduce 
various interviews, published in Pregnant by Mistake, conducted with women who 
had had experiences with unwanted pregnancy.131  Maxtone-Graham refused, 
explaining that the women “told their stories in order to further understanding of 
the Pro-Choice view.  They believed—and expressly stated—that their material 
was not to be used for any other purpose.”132  Burtchaell, upon the advice of his 
publisher’s legal counsel, used the material anyway.133  Maxtone-Graham sued for 
copyright infringement on the theory that the anonymous interviewees had 
transferred the copyright in their commentary to her.  Burtchtaell asserted the 
defense of fair use.134 
The district court explicitly addressed the First Amendment issues at stake in the 
case, noting the “apparent tension” between the Copyright Clause and the First 
Amendment.135  However, as is common in fair use cases, the tension noted by the 
court was between the author’s economic right to her work (not her speech-
implicating right of integrity) and the second user’s free speech rights.  The court 
ultimately found that Reverend Burtchaell’s use was fair, and in doing so made 
several judgments as to the value of the speech interest on both sides.136  These 
judgments resulted in the forced speech of both Maxtone-Graham as an author and 
the interviewees as contributors. 
In evaluating the value of Maxtone-Graham’s work, the court noted that 
Pregnant By Mistake was “essentially reportorial in nature” and that as such, it 
enjoys fewer protections under copyright law’s second fair use factor.137  The court 
also found that Pregnant By Mistake was a book of “source material” that lacked 
analysis (even though the material was edited and conveyed a clear viewpoint).138  
By contrast, the court classified Reverend Burtchaell’s book as “a non-dogmatic 
scholarly argument on behalf of the Pro-Life viewpoint” that attempted to analyze 
the interviewees’ personal accounts “in the most effective and persuasive 
manner.”139  The fact that a use is “non-dogmatic” should have no bearing on 
whether or not it is found to be fair.140  Whether or not a work is dogmatic or non-
dogmatic is a loaded question that misinterprets the purpose and character inquiry, 
which focuses on whether the use was commercial or educational or otherwise not-
 
 130. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1432 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 131. Id. at 1433. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 1434. 
 135. Id. at 1435. 
 136. Id. at 1437–38. 
 137. Id. at 1437. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 1437. 
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for-profit.  The Second Circuit, which ultimately affirmed the Southern District’s 
opinion, acknowledged this error:  “We [do not] think it wise to give much legal 
relevance to whether the allegedly infringing work may be labeled ‘scholarly’ or 
‘dogmatic,’ for the dogma of one individual may be the original scholarship of 
another.”141 
The lower court, in explicitly favoring a use that was “non-dogmatic” against 
one that was “reportorial” was favoring one political statement over another and 
forcing Maxtone-Graham and her subjects to speak through an analysis that directly 
contravened their beliefs.  It is and should be possible, under the fair use doctrine, 
to use direct quotation in political commentary.  However, it is important to 
recognize when fair use is actually being used by a court to privilege certain 
political messages over others. 
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass’n provides a clear example of how a 
distortion of an author’s work violates that author’s right against forced speech.142  
Wojnarowicz was a professional multimedia artist whose work commented on the 
failure of the people and government of the United States to deal with the AIDS 
crisis, and the impact of that failure on the homosexual community.143  To convey 
this message, Wojnarowicz “incorporat[ed] sexually explicit images [into his work] 
for the avowed purpose of shaping community attitudes towards sexuality.”144  
Wojnarowicz received a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) 
for an exhibit at Illinois State University.145 
The American Family Association (AFA), a nonprofit organized for the 
purposes of “promoting decency in the American society and advancing the Judeo-
Christian ethic in America,” was campaigning at the time against the NEA’s 
subsidization of “offensive” and “blasphemous” works of art.146  Donald Wildmon, 
the executive director of the AFA, wrote a pamphlet entitled Your Tax Dollars 
Helped Pay for These ‘Works of Art,’ Which the AFA published and distributed.147  
Included in the pamphlet were photographs of fourteen fragments of 
Wojnarowicz’s work that Wildmon found most offensive, described as part of 
Wojnarowicz’s exhibit catalog for the Illinois State show.148  The pamphlets were 
enclosed in envelopes marked with the words “Caution—Contains Extremely 
Offensive Material.”149  Wojnarowicz sued for copyright infringement and also for 
claims under New York’s Artists’ Authorship Rights Act, New York’s equivalent 
to the then-pending Visual Artists Rights Act, for mutilation of his work and 
damage to his reputation.150  By presenting only the sexually explicit fragments of 
his work and doing so out of context, he argued, his message was fundamentally 
 
 141. Maxtone-Graham v. Burchtaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1261 (2d Cir. 1986). 
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distorted.151 
The court first determined that federal copyright law did not preempt the New 
York Act.152  Prior to the enactment of VARA, moral rights were entirely 
unrecognized by federal copyright law, which therefore could not preempt the 
field.153  The court found that the AFA’s alteration to Wojnarowicz’s work reached 
a far greater audience than his own, thus damaging his reputation and his moral 
right to the integrity of the work.154  Explicitly recognizing the risk that “the public 
[might] associate plaintiff with only the sexually explicit images which were taken 
out of his intended political and artistic context,” the court found that AFA had 
violated the New York Act.155  In addition, the court delivered the following 
exegesis on the speech value of the pamphlet under the First Amendment: 
[T]his Court cannot agree that the alteration, defacement, mutilation or modification 
of artwork is protected speech [under the First Amendment] . . . Clearly, the pamphlet 
contained protectable speech, namely, the protest against the subsidy of “obscene” art, 
which is entitled to the utmost First Amendment protection as the “unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes deserved by 
the people.” . . . The public display of an altered artwork, falsely attributed to the 
original artist, however, is not the type of speech or activity that demands protection, 
because such deception serves no socially useful purpose.156 
The court eloquently defended Wojnarowicz’s right not to speak in a way that 
falsely represented his political message, emphasizing the low value of the 
mutilation of the work in the pamphlet as compared to the value of the pamphlet’s 
message as a whole.  With regards to the stated cause of action, the court fully 
addressed the conflict between the AFA’s right to create speech and Wojnarowicz’s 
right against compulsory speech, and in doing so reached a decision that protected 
the artist and his original speech act from distortion. 
However, when it came to the federal copyright infringement claim and the 
defense of fair use, the court reached a dissonant result, finding that AFA’s use was 
a fair one.157  Because moral rights are unrecognized by federal copyright law, the 
court was guided only by an evaluation of the four statutory factors.  In an analysis 
that is somewhat jarring to read following the court’s vigorous defense of 
Wojnarowicz’s right to integrity, the court followed the reasoning of Maxtone-
Graham and found that the AFA’s dominant purpose for publishing the pamphlet 
was “to oppose federal funding of ‘pornography’” for the purposes of criticism and 
comment rather than to make a profit.158  It emphasized that Section 107, the fair 
 
 151. The court phrased the claim as follows:  “By excising and reproducing only small portions of 
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use provision of the Copyright Act, allows consideration of factors beyond the four 
listed in the statute and that the important First Amendment purpose of criticizing 
the expenditure of federal funds was furthered by AFA’s use, making it fair.159 
It is notable that the fair use portion of the opinion is far less impassioned than 
the moral rights portion.  That dissonance highlights the contrast between the 
federal fair use analysis, under which there is no way to defend Wojnarowicz’s 
right not to speak, and the state law moral rights statute, which protects the 
message of Wojnarowicz’s original work and thus his First Amendment right.  For 
the AFA’s violation of the New York Artists’ Authorship Rights Act, Wojnarowicz 
was awarded an injunction against further publication or distribution of the 
pamphlet in controversy, a mandatory injunction requiring that the AFA mail a 
correction to everyone who received the original pamphlet and nominal damages of 
one dollar.160  The injunction against publication did not categorically prevent the 
AFA from reproducing Wojnarowicz’s images in future pamphlets for the purpose 
of discouraging federal subsidies for art that it found offensive.161  However, it did 
provide that no such pamphlet could suggest to a reasonable reader that a fragment 
of Wojnarowicz’s work constituted his entire work.162 
Wojnarowicz reveals that state law is capable of doing a much better job of 
protecting artists’ moral rights than federal copyright law.  Even if VARA had been 
enacted at the time of Wojnarowicz, it would not have covered the pamphlet.163  
Even if it had covered the pamphlet, the defense of fair use would still have been 
raised and would have likely succeeded (in the same way it did here), because all of 
VARA is subject to the fair use defense in 17 U.S.C. § 107.  Furthermore, the state 
law claim would have been entirely preempted by VARA, meaning that the 
plaintiff’s free speech interest could not have been vindicated.164 
In the end, the court in Wojnarowicz was able to accommodate the First 
Amendment rights of the plaintiff as well as the defendant precisely because it 
could address the state law claim.  It provided equitable relief to Wojnarowicz for 
the harm he suffered to his reputation by construing the New York Artists 
Authorship Rights act to cover AFA’s use of his work by awarding him an 
injunction.  It then justified AFA’s act of copying as fundamentally protectable 
speech (criticism of government) with its finding of fair use. 
The injunction that the court awarded to Wojnarowicz vindicated both his First 
Amendment right not to speak and his moral right of integrity, while opening the 
door to AFA for future uses of his work.  The injunction that the court issued 
prohibited only the intentional and misleading distortion of Wojnarowicz’s images, 
specifically suggesting that the AFA could reproduce his images as long as they did 
not misleadingly present fragments of his work as the whole.  Thus, the injunction 
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did not categorically deny the free speech rights of either Wojnarowicz or AFA.  
This form of relief is a satisfactory method of resolving the free speech conflict 
between Wojnarowicz and AFA.  It was only available because the court was able 
to allow the state law cause of action to go forward, something that would now be 
impossible:  the case preceded the passage of VARA, which would now preempt 
the state law claim entirely.165 
Taken together, these cases demonstrate that to the extent that the creation of a 
copyrighted work constitutes a speech act by the author, a threat to the integrity of 
that work is a threat to the free speech rights of the author.  Under current copyright 
law, including the fair use doctrine and the preemption provisions in VARA, this 
type of free speech threat is incapable of resolution. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMPETING FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
Characterizing certain copyright disputes as conflicts between two First 
Amendment rights is analytically useful for two reasons.  First, it tracks courts’ 
reasoning in these areas, as discussed in detail in Part III.  Second, it suggests that, 
contrary to Supreme Court precedent, there is a clash between copyright law and 
the First Amendment that is not adequately mediated by fair use and the 
idea/expression dichotomy.166  The problem of forced speech demonstrates that 
copyright decisions can create speech regulations.  A finding of liability 
incidentally regulates the second user’s speech, whereas a failure to find liability 
compels the first author to speak.  Though First Amendment doctrine dictates that 
speech regulations must be content-neutral to avoid strict scrutiny, these types of 
copyright decisions are systematically based on value judgments about the two 
competing speech rights that are anything but content-neutral.167  These judgments, 
deployed in the service of a copyright law that purports to sustain a robust free 
speech principle, actually create a normative mode of regulating speech through the 
back door. 
Copyright law is supposed to be relatively neutral in its judgments, affording 
protection to fixed original works of authorship regardless of their purpose or 
perceived quality.  However, it has failed to live up to this type of value neutrality, 
which has effectively become a myth.168  Judges in copyright cases make value 
judgments all the time, both explicitly and implicitly.  The fair use defense 
explicitly requires judges to undertake qualitative evaluation of copyrighted 
works.169  In addition, as we have seen, courts frequently look to the artistic or 
 
 165. See, e.g., Bd. of Managers of Soho Int’l Arts Condo. v. City of New York, No. 01 Civ. 1226 
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 168. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). 
 169. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (describing the purpose and character factor). 
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social speech value of a work to determine its status under copyright.  Judges in 
copyright cases, in other words, regularly evaluate the content of copyrighted 
works. 
First Amendment doctrine, by contrast, relies on the distinction between speech 
regulations that are content-based (and thus receive strict scrutiny) and those that 
are content-neutral (and must only pass some form of intermediate scrutiny).170  
The question of whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral is a 
complicated one that is frequently at issue and outcome determinative in First 
Amendment litigation.171  In its most basic form, however, the test for content 
neutrality is one of purpose.  If the government regulates speech because it 
disagrees with the message, the regulation is content-based and will likely be struck 
down if challenged.  By contrast, if the regulation can be justified without reference 
to the message of the speech, the regulation is probably content-neutral.172 
Returning to the examples discussed in Section III, we see that courts’ 
unacknowledged evaluation of the speech interests of the first and second users are, 
in a basic sense, regulatory.  In Maxtone-Graham, for example, the both district 
court and the Second Circuit favored the defendant’s use of the women’s 
interviews over the plaintiff’s.173  By finding that the defendant’s use was fair, the 
court (as government actor) regulated the use of the underlying work such that a 
compilation of Pro Choice personal narratives was both appropriated and subsumed 
by a Pro Life argument.174  This is not to say that the defendant would be 
categorically wrong to use and build upon arguments diametrically opposed to his 
own in making his point.  The fair use doctrine is, after all, a legal manifestation of 
the fundamental idea that freedom of speech is inherently appropriative.175  
However, there is another speech right implicated by the decision in Maxtone-
Grahamone that belongs to the author—that is ignored and arguably violated by 
the court’s reasoning. 
Similarly, in Wojnarowicz, the court’s willingness to find fair use was both 
productive and suppressive of free speech.176  It was productive of free speech 
because political commentary such as the AFA’s is central to the First Amendment.  
It was suppressive of free speech because it allowed the distortion of 
Wojnarowicz’s work-as-speech.  This is the crucial problem raised by the conflict 
between authors’ rights against compulsory speech and second, “fair” uses.  Any 
decision labeling a use “fair,” when it distorts the underlying message of a work in 
a way that the author disavows, suppresses the author’s speech even as it enables 
the production of the second user’s speech.  This frequently leaves authors’ First 
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Amendment rights underprotected.  Had it not been for the New York’s Artists’ 
Authorship Rights Act and its protection of Wojnarowicz’s right to the contextual 
integrity of his work, for example, his right against compulsory speech would have 
been entirely ignored. 
V.  CRITIQUES & PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Copyright law implicates the First Amendment in ways that it cannot always 
address, as the foregoing cases reveal.  Wojnarowicz suggests that the conflict 
between speech rights in these contexts can be intractable.  One major difficulty 
with respect to free speech conflicts in copyright cases is that it is not certain that 
any line can be clearly drawn between a second use that damages the integrity of an 
underlying work and thus the First Amendment rights of its author, and a second 
use that simply propels the engine of free speech without harming the author’s right 
against compulsory speech. 
Much of the art of the 1980s, for instance, was created on the basic premise that 
art is interactive and appropriative, and that authorship is a confining myth.177  
Take, for example, Sherrie Levine’s “After Walker Evans,” a show in which 
Levine rephotographed Evans’s photographs from a catalog of his work and 
presented them with no further manipulation.178  Contrast Levine’s second use with 
Koons’s appropriation of Blanch’s photograph.179  Koons’s “Niagara” seems to 
distort the underlying photographic work in a way that Levine’s work does not.  
This kind of line, however, is not one for courts or legislatures to draw.  As in 
many areas of the law, the law’s tools may be “too crude to make the fine 
distinctions that prevail in ethics” and in critical theory.180  As the Court observed 
in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., “It would be a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious limits.”181 
The inadequacy of the law’s line-drawing tools poses a difficult practical 
question:  how can courts protect the rights of authors against forced speech, while 
still accommodating the important speech interests of second users?  In the areas 
where the clash typically arisesartistic works and social and political 
commentarythe speech interests on both sides are particularly crucial to a robust 
freedom of speech.182  One would not wish to preclude a second user from 
marshalling available political statements to make new ones, thereby erecting a 
barrier to major First Amendment freedoms.  Nor, however, is it desirable to distort 
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an author’s message in such a way that she is forced to speak through her work in a 
way she expressly disavows. 
One possible solution would be a stronger regime of disclosure requirements 
that could make it easier for first authors to disassociate themselves from their work 
when that work has been distorted.183  When an author does not agree with the use 
to which her work has been put, she could force the second user to include a 
disclosure as to the changes made to the work and a disclaimer as to her disavowal 
of the work.  As a practical matter, required disclosures would probably have little 
effect; viewers, readers and consumers are unlikely to pay attention to disclaimers 
of this kind.184  Think, for example, of “click to read” disclosures and disclaimers 
on standard terms of use agreements.  The average person may click “agree” but 
will probably not take the time to read each provision, even when those provisions 
are binding.185  Because they might fail to have practical effect, disclosure 
requirements alone would not obviate the problem of authors being forced to speak 
through their works. 
Another possible solutionamending VARA to expand the right of integrity in 
both scope and substancewould stifle and possibly eviscerate fair use, trampling 
on free speech rights even while it tried to protect them.186  A categorical right of 
integrity that protected an author’s work from any distortion or mutilation would 
act as a barrier to criticism, political speech, parody and the fair creation of entirely 
new and legitimate works.  It would be hard to defend a rule that prohibited any 
change to any existing work. 
However, a right of integrity, centered on due process, that simply required 
notice to the first author and a meaningful opportunity to object to the distortion of 
the work could be far less detrimental to fair use.187  In this vein, Professor Kwall 
has argued for a narrowly tailored right of integrity that would “vindicate the 
author’s right to inform the public about the original nature of her artistic message 
and the meaning of her work.”188  This right would be triggered when objectionable 
modifications are made to an original work or when the work is displayed in an 
objectionable context while attributed to or likely to be recognized as the author’s 
work.189 
The remedies for violations of this right would include declaratory relief 
mandating an appropriate disclaimer, for prospective harm, and money damages for 
prior objectionable use under certain circumstances.190  By focusing on the act of 
communication between the author and the public, Professor Kwall’s right of 
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integrity mitigates the problem of compelling authors to communicate in ways they 
disavow. 
Another possible solution is the one suggested by the two holdings in 
Wojnarowicz:  interpret VARA narrowly so as not to preempt state moral rights 
statutes, or even amend the governing preemption provision.  Fourteen states and 
Puerto Rico have state moral rights statutes.191  Though they lack uniformity, all 
provide protections for artists’ moral rights that are unavailable under federal 
law.192 
There is a two-part test for state law preemption embodied in Section 301(a) of 
the Copyright Act.193  If both prongs are satisfied, then the state law is preempted. 
The first part asks whether the right it grants is equivalent to one granted by the 
Copyright Act.194  The word “equivalent” is construed broadly, which means that a 
state law may be preempted if it falls within the general realm of the Copyright 
Act, even if the exact right differs from any of the rights found in the Act itself.195  
The second prong requires that the state law apply to works that are subject to 
federal copyright law.196  VARA also has its own preemption provision, which 
reiterates the general two-part test of the rest of the Copyright Act but is arguably 
even broader.197 
VARA preempts all state law rights, both legal and equitable, that are 
“equivalent” to the rights protected under VARA.198  Though the provision is 
broad, there is room to narrow the interpretation of what constitutes “equivalent” 
rights.  In addition, VARA only preempts state law with respect to the types of 
works that VARA itself covers.  A narrow reading of the already restricted category 
of works defined in VARA would prevent federal law from rendering state law 
moral rights statutes completely toothless.  If courts would interpret the preemption 
provisions of VARA narrowly, state laws could be permitted to protect rights of 
integrity where the federal law fails to do so; the corollary of this added protection 
would be the vindication, if not the safeguarding, of authors’ rights against 
compulsory speech. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The lack of protection for moral rights in American copyright law creates a 
basic First Amendment conflict.  On one side of the conflict is the right of the 
author not to speak.  This right is threatened by a distortion or mutilation of the 
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author’s work by a second user, who usually claims fair use.  On the other side of 
the conflict is the right of that second user to create speech.  This conflict, which 
pits one First Amendment right against another, arises when the integrity and 
message of a work is altered or damaged.  The competition between these two free 
speech rights presents difficult practical questions about how to adequately protect 
each and how to define when one has threatened the other.  Though there seems to 
be no way to fully protect speech rights on both sides of copyright disputes, courts 
could mitigate this kind of problem by narrowly construing the preemption 
provisions in VARA to allow state moral rights statutes to step in where the federal 
law cannot. 
 
